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There are thousands of events that a society may deem problematic, ranging from 
economic sanctions to razor blades in apples to meteors hitting the earth. This paper uses 
the theories of objectivism and contextual constructionism to explain why a problem 
becomes important to a society. While this type of research has typically been 
accomplished using moral panic theory, this paper argues for a modified research design 
for studying the importance of social problems, in particular, for the social problems of 
drugs and unemployment. 
In many ways the concept of a disproportion between the objective harm of a 
problem and the importance of this problem drives moral panic research. It is the basis of 
the term 'panic' in this research. Bluntly, moral panics are cases of public ignorance: they 
should (or should not) be thinking something important but are duped into thinking 
otherwise. This, however, is valuative, assuming that harm and concern over this harm 
should be related. In assuming objectivism is generally true, moral panic research 
conflates the conflicting theories of objectivism and constructionism. Generally the harm 
of a problem correlates with the importance of this problem (objectivism), however, 
occasionally institutions „exaggerate‟ the harm of the problem (constructionism), leading 
to an „abnormal‟ amount of attention directed towards the problem. 
Moral panic theory is misguided in conflating these two theories. Specifically, 
there is no reason to assume a priori the harm and the importance of a problem should be 
correlated. However, since moral panic research must theorize why a moral panic 
(constructionism) is not occurring, without this assumption moral panic research is not 
generalizable: if constructionism is correct, why would the harm and concern over this 
harm be related?  Moreover, claiming a disproportion between harm and the concern over 
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harm (a failed test of objectivism) as evidence for the constructionist hypothesis is not 
valid. A lack of evidence for one theory is not evidence for some other theory.  
This paper argues for a modified research design that independently tests the 
theories of objectivism and constructionism. For constructionism, generally, this paper 
argues for an end to a „constructionism of the gaps‟ method of theorizing 
constructionism. For moral panic research in particular, instead of asking „why are people 
occasionally guided away from objectively harmful problems to other, objectively less 
harmful problems?‟ we should be asking „do institutions lead to the importance of 
problems independent of the objective harm of problems?‟ Using constructionism as a 
stop gap for objectivism inhibits the development of constructionism as a general theory. 
Moral panic theory also inhibits the development of the objectivism. If objectivism is 
generally correct, why bring in constructionism to explain a periodic lack of support for 
objectivism instead of theoretically developing the typically correct objectivism? 
In conducting this modified research design, this paper finds that moral panics are 
not aberrations of a generally correct relationship between harm and concern over harm. 
Generally (from 1975 to 2006) the importance of the problem of drugs is correlated with 
institutions‟ portrayals independent of the prevalence of the harm of drugs. Simply 
because there was more concern during the typically studied 1980‟s „drug panic‟ than 
other times does not mean something novel was going on regarding the relationship 
between institutions and the importance of the problem of drugs. Outside of this „panic‟ 
the constructionist relationship remains. 
However, this paper also finds that institutions‟ portrayals of problems do not 
always lead to the importance of a social problem. The test of the social problem of 
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unemployment finds that the unemployment rate predicts the importance of 
unemployment controlling for news reports on unemployment. In this, the test of the 
importance of the social problems of drugs and unemployment show conflicting findings 
for objectivism and constructionism. Because each theory is treated independently, this 
paper then suggests internally consistent extensions of objectivism and constructionism 
that could explain the conflicting of drugs and unemployment respectively.  
As an overview of the paper, after reviewing previous research on the correlates 
of the importance of the problems of drugs and unemployment, the paper criticizes moral 
panic theory. In particular, the assumption that the objectivist hypothesis should be true 
and contextual constructionist theory should be used to explain instances when it is not is 
criticized. A modified research design is then proposed, taking objectivism and 
contextual constructionism as two independent, separately generalizable theories. The 
test of the two theories controls for the other theory‟s variables for potential spuriousness 
instead of conflating the two theories. After reviewing the findings, where the test of 
unemployment supports objectivism and the test of drugs supports contextual 
constructionism, the paper proposes theoretical extensions for both contextual 
constructionism and objectivism to account for these conflicting findings. The 
implications for moral panic research and the correlates of the importance of social 
problems generally are then discussed. 
 
Research on the Correlates of the Importance of Drugs and Unemployment 
First coined by Stanley Cohen (2002:1973), the concept of moral panics has 
yielded hundreds of academic articles as well as a great number of books (e.g. Critcher, 
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2003 and 2006; Glassner, 1999; McCorkle and Miethe, 2002; Welch, 2000; Young, 
2004). Cohen (2002:1973) defines a moral panic occurring when “a condition, episode, 
person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests” (1). Defined by Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) in their review of moral panic 
literature, “in a moral panic, the reactions of (different institutions) and the general public 
are out of proportion to the real and present danger a given threat poses to the society” 
(156). Succinctly, moral panic research investigates when, why and how a social problem 
becomes important for reasons other than increases in the harm of this problem. 
Although there have not been any moral panic studies on unemployment, there 
have been public opinion studies on the connection between the prevalence and the 
importance of the problem of unemployment. Very similar to this study, Behr and 
Iyengar (1985) examine the connections between news stories, economic indicators and 
the public‟s perception of the economy and find that all three of the indicators are 
correlated for the problem of unemployment. They find that “public concern is directly 
affected by economic conditions” (50). More recently, Soroka (2002a; 2002b) shows that, 
in both the U.K. and Canada, while real world concerns influence the public‟s perception 
of unemployment (controlling for news reports on unemployment), the media influence 
the importance of unemployment for the public during periods when the unemployment 
rate is low. These are some of the only studies to take on the question of the correlation 
between the prevalence and the importance of unemployment.
1
 
2
  
                                                 
1
 More have shown how the news reports more bad than good economic news (e.g. Goidel and Langley, 
1995; Harrington, 1989; Nadeau, et al. 1999; Soroka, 2006). I do not use these here as this would be 
expected in both constructionist and objectivist hypotheses.  
2
 Others show the relationship between the economy in general (including unemployment), economic news 
and the perception of the economy (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995; MacKuen and Coombs, 1981; 
Stevenson et al. 1994; Wu et al. 2002). The correlation between the news, the importance of the problem 
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Further evidence that objective threats lead to the importance of unemployment 
comes from Haller and Norpoth (1997). Examining whether people who do and do not 
watch economic news find business conditions more or less favorable than they were a 
year ago shows that almost half of the public admits to not getting any economic news, 
that aggregate opinions of „no-news‟ respondents closely matches the opinion of those 
exposed to economic news, and further, both aggregates opinions are closely aligned with 
economic predictors. Though limited, this research provides evidence that the prevalence 
of economic problems, independent of the news, influence perceptions of the economy.  
Similar to previous research, though more specific due to its focus on 
unemployment, this paper‟s test of unemployment as an important problem to the public 
uses a data set spanning from 1970 to 2007, a much longer span of time than previous 
studies. Further, this study uses annual fluctuations as well as the previously studied 
historical trends. Though both are useful they are theoretically different (Batton and 
Jensen, 2002; Jensen, 1997 and 2007) as using fluctuations shows the correspondence of 
increments of variables while trends look at the correspondence of the rates of variables.  
For the problem of drugs, one of the first pieces of research on the relationship 
between the prevalence and the importance of the problem of drugs was Howard 
Becker‟s Outsiders (1963). He points out that there were few marijuana laws in the early 
1930‟s and the laws that did exist were weakly enforced. However, due to the efforts of 
„moral entrepreneurs‟ who worked to create legislation and media campaigns to convince 
others that marijuana was an important problem, the Marijuana tax act was created in 
1937. Of most relevance here, the public found marijuana to be an important social 
                                                                                                                                                 
and objective economic measures varies depending on the measure, but are typically correlated. Though by 
no means irrelevant to this discussion, I focus specifically on the problem of unemployment here.  
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problem because of the portrayal of a contextual definition of the problem by institutions 
independent of the empirical prevalence of marijuana use. 
James Hawdon (1996) showed that moral panics about drug use in the 20
th
 
century were waged after drug epidemics began to subside rather than during them, 
suggesting the importance of drug use varies inversely with the number of drug users. 
This goes against the objectivist hypothesis as a smaller amount of threat leads to a larger 
amount of public concern. Conversely, Goode (1990) shows a concomitant increase in 
drug misuse during the 1980‟s as the importance of the social problem of drugs 
increased, giving the best evidence for the objectivist argument. However, Beckett (1994) 
shows that this trend is not generalizable outside of this time span as in 1991 to 1992 
drug misuse increased while concern over drugs decreased. 
Studies showing the constructed nature of the importance of the social problem of 
drugs typically examine the escalation of concern over drugs in 1980‟s America. Most of 
these studies, some using regression and others discourse analysis, find that an increase in 
government and media accounts of the dangers of drug use led to greater concern over 
the problem of drugs independent of the prevalence of drug use (e.g. Brownstein, 1991; 
Hawdon, 2001; Orcutt and Turner, 1993; Reeves and Campbell, 1994; Reinarman and 
Levine, 1989). Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) give numerous explanations for the moral 
panic of drugs in the 1980‟s: the increase in knowledge about crack-cocaine, the death of 
athletes from cocaine, increased media coverage of the dangers of drugs, the general 
political climate, the 1986 congressional elections, and an increase in anti-drug 
spokesmen. In this, research has shown a lack of correlation between the prevalence of 
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drug use and the perception of drugs as a problem, explainable by an increase in 
institutions‟ portrayals of the importance of drugs as a social problem. 
There are four ways this paper extends previous research of the correlates of the 
importance of the social problem of drugs. First, other than Hawdon (1996) and Beckett 
(1994), few studies have looked at predictors of the importance of drugs outside a 
particular era (i.e. a panic). This study analyzes correlates of the importance of drugs 
from 1975 – 2006. Second, outside of Beckett (1994), few studies have used time series 
analysis to examine predictors of annual fluctuations of the importance of the problem of 
drugs. Third, although many have pointed to a correlation between drug arrests and moral 
panics on drugs (Becker, 1963; Gilmore, 1999 and 2007; Miller, 1996; Pattillo et al. 
2004; Western, 2006) few have taken the institution of law enforcement seriously as a 
predictor of the public‟s perception of the importance of drugs. Law enforcement arrests 
do not necessarily increase or decrease due to the prevalence of the problem. Law 
enforcement targets different problems at different points in time due to a contextual 
definition of what crimes are important: the institution of law enforcement portrays a 
contextual definition of the problem of drugs through arrests.  
This study investigates whether drug arrests are a predictor, along with news 
stories on drugs in the previous year and the prevalence of drug use, for the importance of 
the social problem of drugs. The findings of this investigation suggest a significant 
relationship between the importance of drugs as a problem and drug arrests, but this 
relationship changes depending upon the number of news stories on drugs the previous 
year. Finding an interaction effect between two contextual constructionist derived 
variables is the fourth way this paper extends previous research. 
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Criticism of Moral Panic Theory 
 
Objectivism 
In investigating the importance of the social problem of drugs and unemployment, 
this paper provides a modified research design of moral panic research, arguing the best 
way to conduct research on the importance of social problems is to use objectivism and 
constructionism as two independent, internally consistent theories. Regarding these 
theories, the main quarrel between objectivism and constructionism involves a particular 
debate over essentialism (Sayer, 1997; Stein, 1992), that is, whether reality can be 
perceived objectively, independent from the context from which it is perceived. 
Moreover, the two theories disagree upon what constitutes a social problem, i.e. whether 
social problems exist due to the objective harm independent of the definition of such 
(objectivism) or due to the contextual definition of harm (constructionism). Instead of 
looking at the dispute over essentialism, or what constitutes a social problem 
theoretically, this study empirically investigates whether the prevalence of a problem (an 
argument derived from objectivism) or contextual definitions of problems, portrayed by 
institutions (constructionism), corresponds with the importance of social problems. 
The theory of objectivism states that occurrences can be empirically verified 
independent of the context from which they are perceived. “The central use of the word 
„objectivity‟ is to refer to what is true independent of any subject judging it to be true. It 
is an objective fact, for instance, that the Earth is the third planet from the sun” (Collier, 
2003, 134). Rather than an object or event constituting a different reality depending on 
the context from which it is perceived (what constitutes a planet?), there is an objectively 
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true reality of the object or event independent of those who perceive it as such. In terms 
of social problems, objectivism, “a variant of the functionalist paradigm” (Goode and 
Ben-Yehuda, 1994, 87), claims that a condition becomes a social problem because “it 
poses a significant threat to the well-being of substantial numbers of people” (McCorkle 
and Miethe, 2002, 5). The objectivist rejects the constructionist view that the reality of an 
occurrence as harmful to a society is dependent upon the context from which the 
occurrence is perceived. Social problems are empirically decipherable as harmful to a 
society independent of the context from which the harm is defined.  
According to objectivism, the reality of harm need not be interpreted in an 
objective manner as the social problem harms individuals independent of how it may be 
interpreted. The importance of a problem need not correspond with the prevalence of the 
problem. However, since occurrences of a problem are actually harming substantial 
numbers of people, will not they be more likely to think of, and institutions more likely to 
portray the importance of, this problem as relevant compared to when many are not being 
harmed by the problem? Put succinctly, the objectivist derived hypothesis tested in this 
research design is that the effects of objectively harmful occurrences will generally make 
the problem important to individuals and institutions. Then, the problem becomes more 
or less important in a society when the harm (occurrences of a problem) is more or less 
prevalent. Although the importance of a social problem need not correspond with the 
prevalence of the problem for objectivism to be true (this is one of many potential 
objectivist derived hypotheses), if this is true it is evidence that social problems become 
important because they pose harm to substantial numbers of people. 
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Criticism of disproportion 
Typically moral panic research does not investigate the objectivist hypothesis, 
assuming it to be true a priori. Moral panic researchers are only interested in instances 
where the objectivist hypothesis is not supported. In their review of moral panic research 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda (1994) argue “if public concern is a logical, almost inevitable, 
product of impending or concrete, inflicted harm, then that concern is not problematic, 
not a phenomenon necessitating an explanation. If, on the other hand, objective harm and 
public concern vary in large measure independently of one another, then this concern 
demands an explanation” (152). While the constructionist hypothesis should be 
investigated, the objectivist hypothesis is unproblematic: it should be happening 
anyways. It is only in cases of a disproportion between harm and concern that moral 
panic researchers are interested. 
Criticisms have been levied against the concept of moral panics, particularly in 
trying to measure the concept of disproportion – “the gap between the harm of a given 
behavior and the concern that that behavior generates in the public, the media, and among 
legislators and social movement activists and members of interest groups” (Goode, 2008, 
535). The main criticism by Waddington (1986) argues that  
without some clear criteria of proportionality, the description of publicly expressed 
concern, anxiety or alarm as a „moral panic‟ is no more than a value judgment. It simply 
says that the person using the term does not believe that the particular problem is 
sufficiently serious to warrant these expressions of concern (257).  
 
Cornwell and Linders (2002) also find the concept of disproportion problematic, claiming 
it conveys a sentiment of rational versus irrational actions. As they point out “moral panic 
theory, because of the emphasis on ``panic,‟‟ has trouble accounting for the essentially 
orderly process through which individual and collective reactions to perceived social 
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threats emerge and get translated into action” (308). „Moral panics‟ are not irrational, but 
stem from general social processes that lead to the importance of social problems.  
Goode (2008) responds to these critics saying that, 
the nay-sayers‟ critiques typically offer a logical contradiction in that they say 
disproportion is impossible to measure because concern and responses to that concern are 
incommensurable. But these critics also say that concern and fear to most conditions that 
generate panics are rational responses to a very real and present danger, as with LSD in 
the sixties. Logically, you cannot have it both ways; either the threat is incommensurable 
with concern, or the concern is a rational, measured response to the threat. (535-536) 
 
This is true: when theorizing about the relationship between concern and harm, harm and 
concern cannot be both proportional and disproportional; claiming both to be true is a 
contradiction. However this means that, with moral panic research as well, logically, you 
cannot have it both ways: either the harm is correlated with concern or the concern is not 
a response to the harm of a problem. Assuming that harm and concern are correlated, but 
occasionally concern is not related to the harm of the problem is contradictory.  
Claiming something should or should not be happening a priori is valuative. The 
aforementioned criticisms against moral panic theory, particularly the gap between harm 
and concern, are similar to the point made by Weber (1949) in „Objectivity in Social 
Science and Social Policy‟, claiming that “scientific analysis can allow us to determine 
the suitability of a given range of means for the attainment of a determinate end. But no 
amount of scientific knowledge can demonstrate logically that a man should accept a 
given end as a value” (Giddens, 1971, 135). Showing the objective reality of something 
extremely harmful cannot demonstrate logically that one should be concerned about this 
harm. As such, claiming that a problem should be important at a particular point in time 
or more important than another less threatening problem, even when based on scientific 
evidence, is not possible. Since whether a problem should be considered important will 
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always be a value judgment, disproportion is valuative in making an assumption that the 
objectivist hypothesis, that harm and concern over harm is related, is generally true. 
 
Criticism of Moral Panics Theory's Research Design 
The major problem with moral panic research is that neither objectivism nor 
constructionism is treated as independent, generalizable theories. In making the valuative 
claim that objectivism should be true then claiming constructionism explains why it is 
occasionally not, objectivism and constructionism are used in tandem to make moral 
panic research generalizable. This is despite the fact the two are contradictory, one 
suggesting harm and concern are correlated while the other does not. If we do not make 
the claim that objectivism should be true, moral panic research is not generalizable; there 
is no reason why constructionism and objectivism will both be true at different points in 
time. In sum, moral panic theory claims the objectivist hypothesis should occur, 
investigates instances where it does not, and develops a theory of constructionism based 
on instances where objectivism is not supported. 
By conflating the two contradictory theories, as discussed below, moral panic 
theory provides evidence for contextual constructionism in way similarly problematic for 
strict constructionism. In his analysis of the uses of social constructionism, Ian Hacking 
(1999) shows that “studies on the social construction of X tend to hold that X, which 
appears to be inevitable, need not have existed; X is not determined by the nature of 
things” (6 and 12). Strict constructionism (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, 94-96), or what 
Hacking calls universal constructionism (Hacking, 1999, 24-25), is the notion that it is 
impossible to know an objective reality since the perception of this reality is perceived in 
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different social contexts– the perception of reality is a social construction. Because any 
perception of reality is defined from a social context, measures of the perception of 
reality and the social relations that influence these perceptions cannot be used as support 
for the theory since these measures are also defined from a particular social context. As 
such, the only way to provide evidence for strict constructionism is to use a negative 
argument- to provide evidence for itself by failing to provide evidence for objectivism. 
However, as Hacking (1999) points out, “no one has argued for a universal 
constructionism, only specific cases of such” (24). Although strict constructionism has 
not been used, more specific studies saying that X is not determined by the nature of 
things, like the concept of disproportion, in the same manner do not show what is 
determining its nature, only providing evidence for constructionism by showing a lack of 
evidence for objectivism. These studies use the negative argument of strict 
constructionism, which is problematic due to the invalidity of support for negative 
arguments generally, explained below.   
Positive statements, those that propose that something is true, propose testable 
statements, analyzed with evidence, to show (or fail to show) the validity of the theory in 
explaining reality. Because it cannot be tested with evidence, strict constructionism relies 
on the negative argument that we cannot accurately perceive an external reality. 
However, not having evidence that we can accurately perceive an external reality (failing 
to support one hypothesis) is not the same as having evidence that we cannot accurately 
perceive an external reality due to some particular reason (supporting another 
hypothesis). For example, by saying our conception of gender is not based on objective 
categories of sexes does not tell us in itself that, among the wide variety of possible 
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alternative hypotheses, gender is socially constructed. This is an argument from personal 
incredulity, more specifically a „constructionism of the gaps‟3 approach to studying social 
constructionism: what does not support the objectivist hypothesis is socially constructed. 
Although strict constructionism entails a negative argument, moral panic theory 
uses the positive theory of contextual constructionism (Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994, 
96) by making the ontological assumption that an objective reality can be perceived 
independent of a social context. Succinctly, it argues that “while deviance and social 
problems are the results of „claim making‟ activities, the „objective‟ dimension can be 
assessed on the basis of some scientific evidence (Ben-Yehuda, 2001). Although an 
objective reality can be deciphered empirically, the positive empirical statement can be 
made that contextual definitions of social problems, portrayed by institutions, lead to 
their importance. 
Although contextual constructionism is a positive argument, the criteria 
(evidence) for contextual constructionism in moral panic research is negative: a lack of 
evidence for objectivism (disproportion) is evidence for contextual constructionism. 
However, failing to provide support for the objectivist hypothesis is not evidence for the 
constructionist hypothesis. A disproportion between harm and concern over this harm 
only indicates a lack of support for a hypothesis of what is happening – not providing 
evidence for any hypothesis of what is happening. Disproportion, a lack of evidence for 
the objectivist hypothesis, is never valid evidence for a theory since the only hypothesis it 
tests fails – simply showing what, of the many potential hypotheses, is not happening.  
                                                 
3
 This comes from the „God of the gaps‟ conception: God is whatever science cannot explain about nature. 
(e.g. Drummond, 2007:1904, p. 333-334). 
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Even more, using a disproportion between harm and concern over this harm as 
evidence for contextual constructionism limits contextual constructionism to cases where 
disproportion is shown. That is, assuming objectivism is correct and contending a lack of 
evidence for objectivism is evidence for contextual constructionism inhibits the 
generalizability of contextual constructionism: contextual constructionism is only correct 
when support for objectivism is not found. Like the strict constructionist argument, it is 
not only erroneous to claim a lack of evidence for objectivism as evidence for contextual 
constructionism, but using contextual constructoinism in this manner leads to a 
„contextual constructionism of the gaps‟ theory of contextual constructionism. By doing 
this, contextual constructionism is merely a stop gap for instances when objectivism is 
not supported rather than a general theory in its own respect.  
In sum, assuming objectivism should be true is a valuative claim. By assuming 
that objectivism is true, moral panic research conflates the two contradictory theories of 
objectivism and constructionism: the objectivist hypothesis should occur but occasionally 
does not due to moral panics (contextual constructionism). In this, two contradictory 
theories can be true at different times and the general theory of moral panics can remain 
true. In using contextual constructionism as an explanation for a lack of evidence for 
objectivism, moral panic research erroneously uses a disproportion between harm and 
concern as evidence for contextual constructionism. In doing this, contextual 
constructionism is turned into an intermittent theory, relevant only due to the fact there is 
a lack of homogenous support for the assumed to be true objectivist hypothesis. To 
alleviate these issues, this paper suggests a more appropriate research design treats the 
harm and concern over harm as an empirical issue. In doing this, this paper investigates 
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contextual constructionism and objectivism as two independent theories, generalizable in 
an internally consistent manner. 
 
Current Study 
 
A Modified Research Design 
This paper uses the theories of objectivism and contextual constructionism to 
explain why a problem becomes important in a society. For instance, does unemployment 
become more important when there is more unemployment (objectivism) or when unions 
demand more benefits and the business owners publicize the dangers strikes pose 
(constructionism)? This study investigates whether the social problems of unemployment 
and drugs become important due to a heightened prevalence of the problem or a 
contextual definition, portrayed through institutions, of the problem as important. 
In order to overcome the aforementioned problems of moral panic research, this 
study independently tests the theories of objectivism and contextual constructionism. 
Instead of conflating the two theories, each theory‟s variables are tested for the other 
theory‟s variables for potential spuriousness. In this, the objectivist derived hypothesis 
tested in this research design is that the effects of objectively harmful occurrences will 
make the problem important to individuals and institutions, controlling for independent 
effects of relevant institutions‟ portrayals of the importance of the problem. Put another 
way, the prevalence of the problem will correlate with the importance of the social 
problem, controlling for institutions‟ portrayals of the problem.  
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For the contextual constructionist hypothesis, in previous moral panic research 
designs using disproportion, a failed test of objectivism is used to provide evidence for 
contextual constructionism. Instead, a test of the contextual constructionist hypothesis 
should state that we fail to accept the hypothesis that objective harm is influencing the 
relationship hypothesized by contextual constructionism. Then, in this research design the 
objectivist hypothesis is controlled for when testing the contextual constructionist 
hypothesis to show that a supported contextual constructionist hypothesis is not spurious: 
institutions‟ portrayals and the importance of social problems both caused by the 
prevalence of the problem. Succinctly, this paper tests the contextual constructionist 
hypothesis that contextual definitions of a problem, portrayed by the institutions of the 
news and (for the problem of drugs) the police, corresponds with the importance of a 
social problem, controlling for the prevalence of the problem. 
This research design is very similar to Beckett‟s (1994) paper where 
constructionism is treated as a separate, general theory. Beckett‟s (1994) paper also tests 
two competing theories of cultural constructionism, where public sentiment leads to 
institutions‟ portrayals, and elite constructionism, where institutions‟ portrayals lead to 
public sentiment, which this paper does not do. Somewhat similar to Beckett‟s (1994) 
case study method findings, this study shows that the number of news stories on drugs the 
previous year is a significant predictor of the importance of drugs, giving evidence for 
elite constructionism. However, since drug arrests and news for unemployment does not 
show to be significant when lagged by a year in either direction, this study cannot 
conclude causality of the constructionist correlations. It is not shown empirically whether 
the „most important problem‟ survey responses are an outcome or an explanatory 
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variable. I take the elite constructionist stance regarding the importance of social 
problems, treating the importance of a problem as an outcome variable.  
The lack of analysis of causality is particularly problematic for drug arrests. The 
direction of causality in who influences arrests and whether arrests influence others is 
unclear. The importance of drugs may lead to same year drug arrests rather than arrests 
influencing the importance of drugs. I take the elite constructionist stance for police 
arrests since decisions to arrest are typically based on contextual, rather than democratic, 
decisions. However, assuming the direction of causality for the correlation between drug 
arrests and the importance of drugs is still controversial since it is not tested explicitly 
here. Future research should investigate both claims of causality. 
Along with posing a new research design, this paper contributes to previous 
research on the importance of the social problems of unemployment and drugs. For the 
social problem of unemployment a much longer span of time (1970-2007) is used and, 
along with the previously used general historical trend, annual fluctuations are used. For 
the problem of drugs, this paper investigates the importance of the social problem of 
drugs outside of a particular era (1975 – 2006), uses time series analysis to test the two 
theories, uses arrests as an indicator of an institution‟s portrayal of the importance of the 
problem of drugs, and finally, finds an interaction effect between the contextual 
constructionist derived variables of drug arrests and news stories on drugs.  
This study defines the importance of a defined social problem through the Gallup 
Poll‟s „Most Important Problem in America‟ survey. The number of stories of the 
problem on network TV news broadcasts and drug violation arrests (for the problem of 
drugs) are used as measures of institutions‟ portrayals of the problem as important. 
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Finally, this study defines the prevalence of a problem through the unemployment rate 
and amount of teenage drug use, as shown by the „Monitoring the Future‟ survey. 
 
Measures 
This study uses five data sets. The importance of social problems is based on the 
Gallup Poll‟s reoccurring national survey asking the opened question “What do you think 
is the most important problem facing this country today?”4 5 The surveys are conducted 
periodically, though at least once per year. When more than one survey occurs per year, 
as is typically the case, the results for each month are averaged. The survey is based on 
personal interviews with a national sample of between 1,000 and 1,600 adults, typically 
more towards the latter.  
Institutions‟ portrayal of the problem is based on data from the Vanderbilt 
Television News Archives. The data set includes a phrase search with no commercials in 
this database with the number of stories on the issue per network per month. The data set 
includes three network news broadcasts: ABC, CBS and NBC. For unemployment the 
data set includes results from a search of „unemployment‟, excluding instances that were 
unrelated to unemployment or about the unemployment of another nation without 
referring to US unemployment. For news stories on drugs the data set includes results 
from the same search method searching for „drug*‟.6  
                                                 
4
 Surveys such as the Gallup Poll‟s have a sampling bias, tending to under-represent low income 
individuals. As such, the issue of unemployment may be skewed due to less unemployed individuals being 
surveyed; this means, for unemployment, the MIP is a conservative measure when testing objectivism. 
5
 As an open ended question, the Gallup Poll survey generalizes responses. Categories such as „drugs‟ are 
difficult to compare to actual occurrences; Cocaine use, for example, would be better responses to compare 
with actual events. However, I find drug use a good correlate for the meaning of drugs as a problem. Also, 
the survey is not done at the same time each year, so I average each instance in a year for all measures. 
6
 There were many considerations that had to be dealt with: Well over half of the stories were regarding the 
sale, trafficking, and use of illicit drugs: these were all counted. Medical marijuana, drug testing, treatment 
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Institutions‟ portrayal of the problem of drugs is also based on the total number of 
drug violation arrests. This is measured by the number of drug use violation arrests as put 
out by the FBI‟s annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR): Crime in the United States (FBI, 
1975 - 2006). The arrest totals are national estimates based on the arrest statistics of all 
law enforcement agencies that provided data to the UCR Program. 
To measure the empirically verifiable prevalence of unemployment this study 
uses the unemployment rate, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To measure 
the empirically verifiable prevalence of drugs this study use the Monitoring the Future 
survey, specifically the number of 12
th
 graders who have used any illicit drugs in the past 
30 days. For the Monitoring the Future survey, each year approximately 50,000 8th, 10th 
and 12th grade students are surveyed about their values, attitudes and behaviors. 
Regarding the time frame, for the problem of unemployment all variables go from 1970 
to 2007, for the problem of drugs all variables go from 1975 to 2006. 
 
Method 
This study conducts time series analyses to test the aforementioned theories. 
There has been a tendency in time series analysis to always compare data sets in terms of 
differences in neighboring year data points as opposed to within year comparisons since 
the latter comes with problems of autocorrelation and non-stationarity. However, as has 
been pointed out (Batton and Jensen, 2002; Jensen, 1997 and 2007), when a theory 
                                                                                                                                                 
of addiction, deaths, and the contraction of AIDS from drug use (but not the drugs that fight AIDS) were 
also counted. Further, stories showing illicit drugs are not as bad as previously thought and attempts to 
legalize the illegal drugs are counted as well. Many that were not included related to prescription drugs, 
however, stories dealing with the illicit abuse of prescription drugs were counted. Cigarettes, alcohol and 
over the counter drug stories were not counted. Finally, and controversially, I decided not to include 
steroids; I felt it was a qualitatively different issue and those saying drugs were the most important problem 
facing the nation would not being saying this due to steroid use. 
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explains historical trends, analyzing annual fluctuations is theoretically misguided; the 
detrended data removes the data‟s historical nature in favor of annual fluctuations despite 
neither being objectively preferred. Since objectivism and constructionism do not specify 
a time scale, this study uses both trend and annual fluctuation data.  
Practically, the tests of objectivism and constructionism will be the same, testing 
the prevalence of the problem, institutions‟ portrayal of the problem and the publicly 
defined importance of the problem. This is due to a research design where each theory‟s 
predictors are controlled for the other theory‟s predictors for potential spuriousness. 
However, each theory will interpret the results in different ways. This study also 
investigates both lagged and non-lagged effects and investigates interaction effects 
between variables to find the best models. For the problem of unemployment this study 
analyzes whether the unemployment rate and news stories on unemployment predict the 
number of responses of unemployment on the „most important problem‟ survey. These 
models with trends and annual fluctuations are specified below (respectively): 
 
UnemployMIP = β0 + β1*UnemployRate + β2*UnemployNews + AR(1) + e 
 
UnemployMIP ti- t(i-1) = β0 + β1*UnemployRate ti- t(i-1) + β2*UnemployNews ti- t(i-1) + e 
 
For the problem of drugs this study analyzes whether the prevalence of drug use, drug 
arrests and the previous year‟s news stories on drugs (and the interaction between news 
stories and drug arrests) predicts the number of responses of drugs on the „most important 
problem‟ survey. These models with trends and annual fluctuations are specified below 
(respectively): 
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DrugMIP = β0 + β1*DrugUse + β2*DrugArrests + β3*DrugNews t(i-1) + β4*(DrugArrests*DrugNews) + e 
 
DrugMIP ti- t(i-1) = β0 + β1*DrugUse ti- t(i-1) + β2*DrugArrests ti- t(i-1) + β3*DrugNews t(i-1)- t(i-2) + 
β4*(DrugArrests ti- t(i-1) * DrugNews t(i-1)- t(i-2)) + e 
 
Results 
 
Unemployment Results 
Using data with historical trends (Table 1), the multivariate model indicates that 
the unemployment rate significantly predicts the perception of unemployment as the most 
important problem in America while controlling for news (which is not a significant 
predictor). For every one percent increase in the unemployment rate there is a 6.05 
increase in the percent saying unemployment is the most important problem, controlling 
for news stories on unemployment. Since there is autocorrelation in this equation, as 
indicated by a low Durbin Watson statistic of 1.16, I utilize an autoregressive model in 
order to control for unexplained serially correlated errors.
7
 The interpretation of the 
results is not affected. The relationship between the perception of unemployment as a 
problem being predicted by the unemployment rate, controlling for news, persists when 
including an autoregressive variable. The R
2
 without the autoregressive variable is 
0.8057, and since the R
2
 with an autoregressive variable is 0.8409, the variable only 
explains 3.5% more of the variation in the perception of unemployment as an important 
problem. Though this is statistically significant, the added value is small relative to the 
explanatory value of the model. 
                                                 
7
 Future research could investigate why a current year‟s publicly defined importance of unemployment is 
continually correlated with the preceding year‟s defined importance of unemployment. 
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Multicollinearity may be a problem in that the correlation between news stories 
on unemployment and the unemployment rate is 0.764. However, the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for both independent variables (since there are only two) is 2.403 while the 
rule of thumb for problematically high colinearity is a VIF of 10 or larger (Miles, 2009). 
Further, modeling these two predictors on the public‟s perception separately, the bivariate 
model using the unemployment rate explains 80.5% of the variation while the bivariate 
model using news stories on unemployment only explains 45.5% of the variation in the 
public‟s perception of unemployment as the most important problem in America. 
 
Table 1 
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Table 2 
 
 
Using between year differences of the variables rather than using each year on its 
own (Table 2), we see the same relationship (though with a smaller R
2
 of 0.6834) 
between the perception of unemployment as a problem, the number of news stories on 
unemployment and the unemployment rate. The multivariate model shows the 
unemployment rate significantly predicting the perception of unemployment while 
controlling for news, which is not a significant predictor. For every one percent increase 
in the unemployment rate there is a 5.858 increase in the percent saying unemployment is 
the most important problem, controlling for news stories on unemployment.
8
  
                                                 
8
 There are no real problematically influential data in these models on unemployment. One exception is this 
model with differenced data, where the difference from 1974 to 1975 is more influential than others on the 
unemployment rate due to the somewhat dramatic jump from 5.64 to 8.475 in these years. 
 26 
Again, there is multicollinearity in the model with annual fluctuations as well. 
However, the VIF for both independent variables is 3.409, suggesting that collinearity is 
not highly problematic. The differences in predictive power between the bivariate models 
is much smaller but still in the same direction, as the unemployment rate explains 67.2% 
of the variance and the news stories on unemployment explains 55.9% of the variance in 
the perception of unemployment as the most important problem facing the nation. 
This evidence supports the objectivist hypothesis that the prevalence of the 
problem (unemployment) corresponds with the importance of the problem. Both data 
with trends and annual fluctuations show that the prevalence of unemployment predicts 
the variation in the perception of unemployment as importantly problematic better than 
the news coverage about unemployment. Considering the fact that the constructionist 
hypothesis would not predict the unemployment rate as significant when controlling for 
the news, and that the objectivist hypothesis would still be supported even if the news 
was a significant predictor, the objectivist hypothesis is better at explaining the 
importance of the social problem of unemployment than the constructionist hypothesis.  
 
Drug Results 
As in the unemployment models, using year to year data and data showing annual 
fluctuations produced similar results for the importance of the problem of drugs. In both 
models there is a significant relationship between the public's perception of drugs as a 
problem and drug violation arrests, but this relationship changes depending upon the 
number of news stories on drugs the previous year (interaction effect).
9
 When there are 
                                                 
9
 When modeling the previous year‟s news stories by the MIP survey and drug arrests, for both trend and 
annual fluctuation data, the previous year‟s news predicts both responses to drugs as the most important 
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more news stories on drugs the previous year, drug arrests will be associated with a 
higher percentage of people finding drugs to be an important problem compared to when 
there is a lower number of news stories on drugs the previous year. Table 3 shows the 
results of the model predicting the perception of drugs as the most important problem 
using year to year data while Table 4 shows the model using data as annual fluctuations. 
Both models show news stories on drugs and drug violation arrests are significant 
predictors, while drug use is an insignificant predictor, of the percent saying drugs are the 
most important problem facing the nation. 
 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
problem and the drug arrest rate. As such, the relationship between the public‟s perception of drugs and 
drug arrests may be spurious, both being caused by the previous year‟s news. However, since I find an 
interaction effect, that the effect of the previous year‟s news on drug responses to the most important 
problem depends on different levels of same year arrests, the model here gives a better prediction of the 
most important problem than the effect of news independent of drug violation arrests. 
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Table 4 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the interaction effect described above. When news reports on 
drugs are at a very low level, as drug arrests go up the perception of drugs as a problem 
actually goes down. This negative correlation between arrests and drugs as an important 
problem is only at very low levels of news reports on drugs, changing to a positive 
correlation when there are 1.172 news stories (the point of inflection) or more. For 
example, as shown in Figure 1, when news reports on drugs are average (4.87 stories per 
network per month) or at their maximum (19.06 stories) more drug arrests lead to more 
people claiming drugs as the most important problem. Similarly, Figure 2 shows a 
negative relationship between changes in arrests and changes in the importance of the 
problem of drugs when news stories have significantly reduced. However, if the 
reduction in news stories per network per month is 5.64 or less (or they increase) from 
the previous year then the relationship between drug arrests and the number claiming 
drugs as the most important problem is positive. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 2 
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As might be expected from the studies on the 1980s „drug panic‟, there are some 
issues with influential data points. In the historical trend model, 1989 is the most 
influential point, influencing the slopes of news stories, particularly the interaction 
between news stories and arrests, and the model in general
10
; 1990 is problematically 
influential for the model in general as well.
11
 A similar problem emerges in the model 
with annual fluctuations. The difference from 1987 to 1988 is particularly problematic, 
disproportionately influencing the slopes of arrests and the interaction between arrests 
and news. The difference from 1989 to 1990 is also influential in this regard but to a 
lesser degree.
12
 The difference between arrests in 1987 and 1988 was 217,800 while the 
difference in 1989 and 1990 was a reduction in 272,200 arrests, both relatively large, 
suggesting a rapid proliferation of drug violation arrests in 1988 then rapid decline in 
1990.
13
 Though these models can still be generalized despite these data points
14
, these 
influential years should be noted as anomalous. 
These models support the constructionist hypothesis that the portrayal of the 
problem (drugs) by institutions‟, controlling for the prevalence of the problem, 
corresponds with the importance of the social problem. In both models with annual 
fluctuations and changes over time drug use was insignificant while drug violation arrests 
and the number of news stories on drugs the previous year were significant in predicting 
                                                 
10
 For 1989 the dfbeta (measuring the influence of an observation on each slope coefficient) is - 3.26 for 
news and 4.11 for the interaction between news and arrests and has a Cook‟s distance of 3.38, suggesting 
significant influence over these slopes and the model in general. 
11
 The dffit (measuring the influence of an observation on the predicted value of the dependent variable) is 
problematic for 1989 and 1990, with a score of 5.388 and -3.119 respectively. 
12
 Like the model with trends, 1988-89 is somewhat influential for the news variable with a dfbeta of -1.29.  
13
 Taking a variable into account which also rapidly rose in 1988 then declined in 1990 to explain these 
phenomena would lead to a better model. Presidential addresses on the issue of drugs might be an example. 
14
 A model with historical trends excluding the years 1989 and 1990 has the same results as the reported 
model. A model with annual fluctuations excluding 1987-88 and 1989-90 also has the same results as the 
reported model. 
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the perception of drugs as the most important problem. Further, and somewhat 
unexpectedly, institutions‟ portrayals (drug arrests and news stories on drugs) interact to 
affect the perception that drugs are the most important problem.  
 
Discussion 
This paper gets past problems coming from the moral panic research design by 
independently testing objectivism and constructionism as internally consistent, 
generalizable theories. However, the findings in this paper show that neither theory is 
supported by both empirical tests. The conflicting findings indicate that, as is, neither 
objectivism nor contextual constructionism are theories that can be generalized to explain 
the importance of the social problems of both unemployment and drugs.  
The findings on the problem of unemployment agree with previous research (Behr 
and Iyengar, 1985; Haller and Norpoth, 1997; Soroka, 2002a; 2002b) supporting the 
objectivist hypothesis. Using data from 1970 to 2007, analyzing both trends and annual 
fluctuations, the unemployment rate significantly predicts the perception of 
unemployment as the most important problem in America while controlling for news, 
which is not a significant predictor.  
Conversely, agreeing with previous research on the problem of drugs (Beckett, 
1994; Brownstein, 1991; Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 1994; Hawdon, 2001; Orcutt and 
Turner, 1993; Reeves and Campbell, 1994; Reinarman and Levine, 1989), using data 
from 1975 to 2006, using both trends and annual fluctuations, there is support for the 
constructionist hypothesis. Contextual definitions of the problem of drugs, as portrayed 
by the institutions of the news media (stories) and police (arrests), correlate with the 
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percent claiming drugs as the most important problem in America, independent of the 
prevalence of the problem of drug use. This study also extends previous research, 
showing that, for the problem of drugs, institutions‟ portrayals lead to the importance of 
the problem outside of specific eras known as panics. These findings also extend research 
on which institutions have a significant correlation with the importance of the social 
problem of drugs. The police‟s portrayal of drug use, by way of arrests, correlates with 
the importance of the problem of drugs. Further, this institution‟s portrayal of the 
problem of drugs interacts with the news media‟s portrayal of the problem. The more 
news stories the previous year, the more drug violation arrests affect the number claiming 
drugs as the most important problem. 
More than extending previous research on the correlates of the importance of the 
problems of drugs and unemployment, this research design gets past the problems of 
measuring disproportion. As there is no reason to assume a priori a correlation between 
the prevalence and the importance of social problems, the importance of the problem of 
drugs is much more than a panic. Contextual definitions of drugs, portrayed by 
institutions‟, correlates with the importance of the social problem of drugs controlling for 
the prevalence of drug use. Similarly, the findings on unemployment are not proportional 
in an objective sense, but proportional in terms of a theory of correlation that may or may 
not be supported by evidence. By deriving positive empirical statements from both 
objectivism and contextual constructionism we can investigate what does, rather than 
what should and may not, predict the importance of social problems. 
As each test supports a different hypothesis, as they exist, the theories of 
objectivism and constructionism are not generally supported. The social problems of 
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unemployment and drugs tested here are quite different, the importance of which caused 
by different processes. However, each theory would claim that the importance of these 
problems is caused by the same underlying process. Since each problem shows different 
results, perhaps these differences can point to modifications for both constructionism and 
objectivism in predicting the importance of social problems generally.  
Moral panic theory would suggest the presence of folk devils (a person or group 
portrayed as deviant) is the major variable separating these two problems: while one 
could argue the problem of unemployment does not involve folk devils, with drug related 
moral panics, “sellers or dealers are always folk devils” (Goode, 2008, 537). However, 
like the concept of disproportion, to use folk devils as an explanation one would need to 
talk about how concern over folk devils correlates with the rise and fall of concern over 
social problems generally, not only when what „should be happening‟ is not. Unless they 
are tied into the theory of objectivism, folk devils cannot be constructionist aberrations of 
the assumed to be correct objectivist hypothesis. How folk devils influence social 
problems needs to be connected to an internally consistent theory. 
 
The Context of the Positive 
This paper does not extend moral panic‟s folk devil idea. However, it does 
attempt to extend the objectivist and constructionist hypotheses to incorporate the 
conflicting findings. The conflicting findings of this study indicate that the importance of 
a social problem occasionally depends upon the problem‟s empirically verifiable 
prevalence but other times may depend upon institutions‟ portrayal of the problem. Then, 
there are two modified hypotheses that can be derived from this study: (1) the prevalence 
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of problems corresponds with the importance of problems, but institutions‟ may affect 
this relationship; (2) institutions‟ portrayals correspond with the importance of problems, 
but the prevalence of problems may affect this relationship. These are derived from the 
objectivist and contextual constructionist theories respectively. 
Taking the modified objectivist hypothesis, as stated above, social problems may 
be problems independent of the perception of them as a problem. Therefore, the objective 
harm of a problem may increase, however, the importance of this harm may be 
reinterpreted through institutions‟ as some other problem. Increases in the importance of 
the social problem of drugs, for example, may actually stem from increases in violent 
crime or homelessness
15
; however, these objective social problems may be reinterpreted 
through institutions such as the news media or law enforcement as a problem of drug use. 
If this were the case, the empirically verifiable prevalence of homelessness or violent 
crime (for example) would correlate with the importance of drugs. This differs from past 
moral panic research as the objectivist hypothesis is maintained: the prevalence of the 
problem leads to the importance of the problem but institutions‟ portrayal of the problem 
effects this relationship.  
As it stands contextual constructionism does not theorize how the empirically 
verifiable prevalence of a problem affects contextual definitions of social problems 
despite an ontological assumption that reality can be empirically verified. Though 
theoretically sound, the contextual constructionist theory can be extended to include how 
the empirically verifiable prevalence of a problem affects contextual definitions of this 
problem as important. Specifically, a hypothesis can be posed about how the prevalence 
                                                 
15
 These are hypothetical; I find no evidence here to support this extended objectivist hypothesis. 
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of a problem affects the relationship between contextual definitions of a problem, as 
portrayed by institutions, and the importance of a problem in a society. 
Contextual definitions of the importance of social problems, as portrayed through 
institutions‟, are intrinsically linked to the perception of, and potential to portray, reality 
through particular social contexts. The importance of a social problem may change 
depending on the interpretation of occurrences as problematic.
16
 Moreover, the 
importance of a problem may change depending on how institutions portray reality. For 
example, in the context of an experiment, psychological studies asking whether objects or 
events are importantly problematic will reveal a large number of affirmative responses to 
these artificially triggered problems, even when the importance of the problem is 
unconsciously triggered (e.g. Bargh, 1994; Bargh and Pietromonaco, 1982; Greenwald 
and Banaji, 1995). A problematic event in a certain context, even when previously 
unimportant, may become important when something primes the individual of its 
importance. Many times priming, and the resulting importance, of a problem is 
accomplished by institutions, organizations and mechanisms such as social movements, 
'moral entrepreneurship', education and cultural production. 
Generally, institutions prime a particular problem as important to the public. 
Although the definition of what constitutes a problem depends on a particular context, 
institutions exposing individuals to representations of a contextually defined problem will 
                                                 
16
 Though I do not investigate or theorize how or why something is interpreted as a problem, a change in 
interpretation of an event from unproblematic to problematic may also affect the importance of social 
problems. Future research could examine two related constructionist hypotheses of how events become 
problematic: (1) institutions affect the definition of problems by convincing the public a previously 
unproblematic occurrence is problematic. That is, institutions may not only influence the importance of 
problems (tell the public what to think about), but may also influence what constitutes a problem (tells the 
public what to think); (2) since the context from which events are perceived affects the definition of the 
event as problematic, changes in the contexts from which institutions‟ portrayals of the problem are 
perceived may lead to changes in the interpretation of events as problematic (e.g. an increase in anti-drug 
institutions, situations, roles and activities means more people perceiving events from an anti-drug context). 
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make the problem important. Analogous to institutions exposing individuals to 
representations of a problem, the occurrence of the problem may expose individuals to 
the problem as well. That is to say, occurrences defined as problematic in particular 
contexts may also become important through the direct exposure of the occurrence to 
these particular contexts. For example, if a murder occurs to someone close to the victim 
or if someone‟s neighbor is a drug user, when these occurrences are contextually defined 
as problematic, homicide and drug use may become more important respectively. 
Generally, occurrences of murder and drug use are not experienced directly, but become 
important indirectly through institutions‟ portrayals to those who would find them 
problematic.
17
 However, the direct portrayal of an occurrence to someone who defines 
the occurrence as problematic will prime this individual to find the problem important as 
well.  
Since the occurrence of a problem may expose individuals to a problem, when 
experienced directly by those who find the occurrence problematic, the empirically 
verifiable prevalence of a problem should be somewhat correlated
18
 with the number of 
people claiming a problem important. In effect, when experienced directly, the 
empirically verifiable prevalence of a problem will act like an institution portraying the 
reality of the problem. The effect of the prevalence of a problem on the relationship 
                                                 
17
 This is similar to a dependency theory of the news effects - individuals will be more dependent on media 
for information on issues they do not experience directly. (Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur, 1976; Zucker, 1978) 
18
 Though the occurrence of a problem may make the problem important, the problem only becomes 
important to those who do not directly experience the occurrence through institutions. Due to differential 
access to portraying reality through institutions, the prevalence of a problem will generally be uncorrelated 
with the importance of a problem in society: more people experiencing a problem directly will not 
necessarily lead institutions to portray the problem as more important. Compared to those without access to 
institutions, if a small number of people directly experience an occurrence they find problematic, and they 
have a substantial ability to portray their contextual definition of the problem as important through 
institutions, they will typically be able to affect the publicly defined importance of social problems. Still, 
the objective prevalence of the problem may affect the hypothesized contextual constructionist relationship. 
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between contextual definitions of problems portrayed by institutions‟ and the importance 
of social problems varies depending on two criteria: (1) differential exposure: whether 
occurrences are directly experienced by individuals and (2) differential interpretation: 
whether the directly experienced occurrence is interpreted as problematic. Putting these 
together, when individuals who find an occurrence problematic directly experience the 
occurrence, the empirically verifiable prevalence of the problem will affect the 
relationship between institutions‟ portrayals and the importance of social problems. 
Although this paper cannot empirically test this hypothesized effect of the 
prevalence of the problem on the contextual constructionist hypothesis because of the 
data used, this paper theoretically tests this hypothesized effect using the social problems 
of unemployment and drugs. Theoretically, those who find drug use problematic are not 
the ones experiencing drug use directly as drug users do not tend to find drug use 
problematic and drug use is typically done away from those who would find it 
problematic: those who find drug use problematic do not directly experience drug use. 
Also, theoretically, those who find unemployment problematic experience unemployment 
directly
19
: those who find unemployment problematic are directly experiencing 
unemployment. As such, this study theoretically splits these problems into those who find 
the occurrence problematic directly or only indirectly experiencing the occurrence.  
Theoretically, the findings support this theory. The empirically verifiable 
prevalence of unemployment affects the relationship between contextual definitions of 
the problem portrayed by institutions and the importance of social problems while the 
prevalence of drug use does not affect this relationship. Future research could investigate 
                                                 
19
 This point is somewhat analogous to the popular debate in political science asking, “when assessing 
leaders, do voters look to the national economy (sociotropic) or to their pocketbooks (egocentric)?” (Lebo 
and Box-Steffensmeier. 2008, p.21). This hypothesis would argue there is an interaction effect.  
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whether those who find occurrences problematic that experience the problem, either 
directly byway of actual occurrences of the problem or indirectly through institutions‟ 
portrayals of the problem, find it importantly problematic compared to those who do not 
experience the problem.  
 
Conclusion 
The findings of this paper generally agree with previous research on the 
importance of the social problems of unemployment and drugs, but also extend this 
research, using trend and annual fluctuation data and an extended time frame. Further, 
drug arrests have not been used, nor has an interaction between institutions‟ portrayals 
been shown, as a predictor of the importance of the social problem of drugs.  
The findings show that the unemployment rate is correlated with responses of 
unemployment as the most important problem facing the nation. This relationship holds 
when controlling for news stories, which are insignificant. Further, there is a significant 
relationship between the number of responses of drugs as the most important problem 
facing the nation and drug violation arrests, and this relationship changes depending upon 
the number of news stories on drugs the previous year. Both arrests and news stories are 
significant for the problem of drugs, unlike the prevalence of drug use.  
In independently testing the theory of contextual constructionism, the 
constructionist hypothesis is generally supported in describing the correlates of the social 
problem of drugs but unsupported in describing unemployment. The correlation between 
institutions‟ portrayals and the importance of the problem of drugs is not an aberration of 
the objectivist hypothesis but a general trend. Conversely, in independently testing the 
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theory of objectivism, the objectivist hypothesis is generally supported in describing the 
social problem of unemployment but unsupported in describing drugs. In this, 
independent tests of the importance of the social problems of drugs and unemployment 
show conflicting findings for constructionism and objectivism. In light of these findings, 
this paper suggests extensions of objectivism and constructionism that could explain the 
conflicting findings of drugs and unemployment respectively. 
Several critical issues can be raised about this study. For the unemployment 
model, there is an unexplained predictor showing why the importance of unemployment 
is continually correlated with the preceding year‟s socially defined importance of 
unemployment. Also, in the models about drugs, there are some influential data points: 
1989 and 1990 were influential for the slope of the news predictor while the fluctuations 
between 1987-88 and 1989-90 were influential for the slope of the arrest predictor. Also 
for the model on drugs, the drug use variable only records high school seniors. Further, I 
use a small number of variables, making this study vulnerable to spuriousness. I only use 
one variable to test the objectivist hypothesis for drugs (drug use) and the constructionist 
hypothesis for unemployment (news). Demographics such as age, race, sex, or location 
are not tested as predictors either. Finally, this paper assumes that the correlation between 
drug arrests and concern over drugs means that arrests lead to concern over drugs rather 
than concern over drugs leading to arrests. When possible, future research should 
investigate both directions of causality for any constructionist relationship. 
Along with the results, this paper argues that moral panic studies, and social 
constructionism generally, can not use negative arguments to provide evidence of their 
validity: a lack of evidence for objectivism is not evidence for constructionism. The 
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preferred method of researching the importance of social problems would investigate a 
positive argument, testing whether contextual definitions, portrayed by institutions, 
organizations and mechanisms are causing the importance of the social problem, 
controlling for the empirically verifiable prevalence of the problem for potential 
spuriousness. By utilizing a positive argument, contextual constructionism can be 
liberated from the „constructionism of the gaps‟ approach.  
Using constructionism solely in a negative fashion is not productive for the 
constructionist argument. Contextual constructionism should be an independent theory, 
not just an explanation for what objectivist hypotheses fail to explain. As a positive 
argument, we can begin expanding the contextual constructionist argument as a general 
theory of the importance of social problems. This study attempts to show this potential as 
the contextual constructionist extension proposed develops the theory in a positive 
direction. Although this extended hypothesis may not be verified in further research, this 
paper is a call to develop a theory of the reality, rather than „misperceived‟ reality, of the 
constructionist argument. As previous research generally remains valid, the purpose here 
is not to criticize per se but to develop methodologically rigorous positive hypotheses as a 
way to investigate the reality of constructionism: the futility of the negative must be taken 
seriously if we are to better understand the context of the positive.  
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